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TOBY Milsom was “the most distinguished legal historian of the twentieth 
century”. So read the obituary in The Times.1 Like all obituaries there it was 
unattributed, but John Baker will surely forgive me if I compromise anonymity 
and say that the words are his. Few of us would dare disagree, and few of us 
would want to.  
He did not publish prolifically, though everything he did publish deserves 
to be read and reread and reread again. At least two major pieces of work 
remain in typescript. His first substantial work, his fellowship dissertation at 
Trinity College, was on the history of administrative law. It was awarded the 
Yorke Prize, though the Faculty Board withheld half of the award until such 
time as it was prepared for publication. We are still waiting. Some forty years 
later there were his Ford Lectures in Oxford, which I was privileged to hear as a 
young academic. A follow-on from his work on the land law of the twelfth 
century, we are still waiting for their publication too. Their author was without 
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doubt a perfectionist, but the scholarly community would be far the richer for 
their publication. 
In common, I suppose, with everybody whose first exposure to English 
legal history was within the last half-century, my first acquaintance with 
Milsom’s work was through the Historical Foundations of the Common Law, 
then in its first edition.2 I was totally unprepared for it. Not in the sense that it 
made the scales drop from my eyes and see legal history in a completely 
different way, but in the sense that I misguidedly saw it as a student textbook 
which would tell me the truth about what happened. It might have been 
different if I had read the reviews of the work. Geoffrey Hand, in the Irish 
Jurist, had warned that hardly any but the best of final year undergraduates 
would make sense of large tracts of it.3 Not quite right, I think. It is seductively 
easy to make sense of it, the problem is to separate out the facts from the 
interpretation of those facts. David Yale, in the Cambridge Law Journal, was 
more accurate. “It is not a book from which one learns the subject”, he wrote, 
but rather a work of interpretations, an exercise of imagination.4 
I might have been better prepared if I had read the introduction to the 
work, and ruminated on it. “Legal history is not unlike that children’s game in 
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which you draw lines between numbered dots, and suddenly from the jumble 
a picture emerges; but our dots are not numbered.”5 The image was to recur 
through Milsom’s work, and it remains fundamental to our understanding of 
much of his writing. The dots may be fixed points, facts if you like, but we can 
only make sense of them against the background of the whole picture, and the 
picture can only be known in so far as it is reconstructed by the legal historian. 
Moreover, the picture can only ever be provisional. “It is right to say clearly at 
the outset,” he ends the introduction, “that no major proposition in legal 
history is ever likely to be final, and that any single picture must be a personal 
one.”6 
It was only a few years later that I came across the legal introduction to 
the Selden Society edition of the medieval tract known as Novae Narrationes, 
which had appeared in 1963.7 No seductively easy read, no imaginative joining 
of dots, but a highly technical commentary on the forms of action in the late 
thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries. Even the expert legal historian 
needs to keep concentration and perhaps have a dictionary to hand. Just one 
example from the first page of the commentary, on the principal writ of right. 
“If a parcel were claimed, but less an exception, the exception had to be 
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carefully specified both in the substantive claim and later in laying the 
esplees...”8 
Consideration of these two works together reveals just why Milsom was 
so powerful a legal historian. The combination of technical mastery with 
imaginative reconstruction produced a kind of legal history which we had not 
seen before. It was a combination which was to characterise all of his 
published writing. 
To this we need to add a third element, his use of court records, of plea 
rolls, as a source of data to explicate the development of substantive law. 
Milsom was not, of course, the first person since Maitland to use plea rolls in 
this way. Albert Kiralfy had done so in his book on the action on the case, 
published in 1951,9 but where Kiralfy had referred to just over 100 cases from 
the records up to the end of the reign of Edward III, Milsom referred to more 
than 400 in his three articles on trespass from Henry III to Edward III published 
in the Law Quarterly Review in 1958.10 Nor was it simply the number of cases 
that were cited that was impressive, it was the number of rolls which had been 
combed to produce these glimmers of light on the early history of the common 
law of tort. I do no disservice to Kiralfy when I say that he dipped into plea rolls 
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for illustrative examples, whereas Milsom used the rolls as his source of 
information. The discussions in the early reports known as Year Books were of 
undoubted importance, but in their nature they only shed light on what was 
unusual enough to be worth discussing and noting down. Plea rolls, by 
contrast, could show what was more or less normal, and the normal or routine 
was far more revealing of the working of the law than was the unusual. The 
use of plea rolls by medievalists today is commonplace; it was very much less 
so half a century ago. Slightly behind in his study of the journals, in March 1959 
the historian G. O. Sayles lamented that no-one in England was systematically 
studying the records of the Court of Common Pleas, though it was there that 
so much of the history of the Common law lay hidden. But he added in a 
footnote, “Since I spoke these words, Mr. Milsom of New College, Oxford, has 
told me of his interest in the records of the common bench...”11 Here was the 
path-breaker in the new world of English legal history. 
The set of three articles on trespass constituted Milsom’s master-piece, 
in the medieval sense of the work which marked the transition from 
journeyman to master in a gild. His note to Plucknett, sending him an offprint 
of the articles, reveals his uncertainty about the way in which the arguments 
will be received: 
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Professor Plucknett, With best wishes and trepidation. A small but real 
comfort is that I cannot guess whether, if you denounce me for this, it 
will be as a heretic or a copycat.12 
The opening couple of pages lay out the primarily destructive thesis, that 
trespass was not inevitably concerned with direct forcible injuries, but, as he 
had earlier put it put it, just meant wrong.13 Gone in a moment was the then-
current thinking that the writ of trespass was derived in some sense from the 
appeal of felony or the assize of novel disseisin.14 Instead we were left with a 
jurisdictional question, what was it that enabled certain wrongs to be 
actionable in the royal courts? What had appeared for centuries to be a 
fundamental division between trespass and trespass on the case was reduced 
to a rather less fundamental question of how a civil action for wrongdoing 
should be pleaded. Medieval tort law was being radically reshaped. 
We must be careful not to exaggerate Milsom’s originality. A year earlier 
Derek Hall had published a short piece in the Law Quarterly Review on the 
early history of trespass writs,15 G. O. Sayles had been chipping away at the old 
orthodoxy,16 Professor Plucknett and Dr. Dix had effectively undermined the 
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old theory linking the emergence of trespass on the case to the Statute of 
Westminster the Second,17 though the arch-conservative Oxford scholar Philip 
Landon had dismissed their thinking as “revolutionary”.18 He might as easily 
have said “bolshevik”. Glanville Williams had already hinted at the relationship 
between trespass and case,19 and in an earlier pedagogic article Milsom had 
himself referred to views expressed orally by Hamson, Holland, Thorne and by 
the young Michael Prichard.20 But what was truly original about Milsom’s 
treatment of the early history of trespass was that it delineated the scope of 
the action in detail. Trespass may have meant just wrong, but to say that the 
scope of liability was wrongful conduct was far too bland a formulation to give 
much idea of the medieval law, as if a teacher of the law of torts in the twenty-
first century were to say that tort meant wrong and leave it at that.  Instead we 
get the heading of wrongs to land subdivided into ejectment, reaping crops, 
depasturing, hunting, shooting and fishing; wrongs to the person  subdivided 
into assault and battery, false imprisonment, wrongs to servants, and 
abduction; wrongs to goods into de bonis asportatis, damage by fire, damage 
by animals, and other forms of damage. The thorny question of the origins of 
trespass on the case was redefined. No longer was it an issue of the emergence 
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of a new form of action, but of the propriety of using special writs instead of 
the general writ alleging force of arms and a breach of the King’s peace. 
Problems remained, since some fairly radical change did seem to have 
occurred in the late 1360s, but the redefinition of the question meant that it 
was possible to approach the answer in a very different way from before; and 
the detailed consideration of cases from the plea rolls as well as the reports, 
the year books, meant that the answer was far more nuanced. 
The legal history of the later fourteenth and fifteenth centuries gives 
greater scope for the use of reported discussions of the law as found in the 
Year Books than does that of the thirteenth and early fourteenth centuries, 
and two articles on what we might broadly think of as contractual litigation 
typify this. The more accessible, “Sale of Goods in the Fifteenth Century”, 
began in thoroughly self-deprecating mode: 
This is a descriptive article, without a point, begun with two aims. The 
narrower was to survey the vicinity of certain landmarks; the “real” 
nature of contracts enforced by debt and detinue, and the passing of 
property. Dejectedly looking at the results, little can be said except that 
the landmarks are gone; but some facts have emerged which seem 
worth recording.21 
I rather doubt whether many of us would agree that the removal of well-
established landmarks was a reason for dejection when so much scholarship is 
based on their uncritical acceptance, but Milsom no doubt wanted to do for 
debt what he had done for trespass a few years earlier. His diffidence is 
reflected in his note to Plucknett when sending him an offprint: 
I’m not very happy about this, but hope that some of the spadework 
may turn out to be useful.22 
He continues the article with marginally more ambition: 
The wider aim was selfish: the writer is preparing a study, in more detail 
than those existing, of the personal actions down to 1600; and the 
difficulty, as always, is in asking the questions. 
It is all very Milsomian. The “real” nature of contracts is in scare quotes, a 
throwback to the time when English lawyers might have thought in Roman 
terms which do not quite fit the English evidence, and where the use of the 
terminology obscured more than it explained. I like the contrast with Plucknett 
a generation earlier. In the margin of his copy of James Barr Ames’ Lectures on 
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Legal History, where Ames had written of the force of the words of agreement 
in debt, Plucknett’s annotation reads “But debt was not created by words but 
by things – real contracts”.23 No scare quotes here, and only a sense of 
puzzlement that Ames had missed so obvious a point that debt was only 
generated by a real contract. Milsom’s unpicking of the supposedly real nature 
of debt reflects his approach to trespass in the trilogy of articles of 1958. His 
feet are firmly on the ground in the real world of the most typical transaction, 
the sale of goods, not in the clouds of legal abstraction. Get the details of sale 
right, and you can move from there into other types of contract which might 
work in the same way or might work differently. By the same token, one of his 
primary concerns was the availability of wager of law, surely one of the 
primary issues for litigants in practice which was too easily overlooked by the 
legal historian of the twentieth century.  This same concern underlay the 
second of the pair of articles on contractual litigation, “Account Stated in the 
Action of Debt”, a piece that puts demands on the reader and raises important 
questions about the relationship between local courts and the common law. 
But the most Milsomian feature is in the last clause of his opening of the sale 
of goods article. “The difficulty, as always, is in asking the questions.” All of us 
who have grappled with the problems of early modern or medieval law will 
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recognise the truth of this, and all of us will be conscious of our own failings in 
getting the questions right.   
Trying to find the right question lay behind what is probably Milsom’s 
most noteworthy contribution to the history of the substantive law, the 
development of the law of real property in the twelfth century. It began when 
he was preparing a new edition of Pollock and Maitland’s History of English 
Law: 
There is a single particular recollection: a sudden idea about the sense of 
seisin and disseisin came one evening when waiting at Charing Cross 
station for a train home. In retrospect that seems to have been the 
starting point.24 
From this epiphany there sprang what Milsom described as his greatest heresy, 
that the assize of novel disseisin, introduced under Henry II, was concerned not 
with the dispossession of feudal tenants generally, but in particular with the 
abuse by feudal lords of their seigneurial power. Only a lord could seise a 
tenant, and only a lord could disseise him.25 
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I need to spend a little time on this, conscious that a number of scholars, 
some of them at this lecture, have subjected it to detailed scrutiny with far 
greater expertise than I can muster. 
The background can be sketched easily. The assize of novel disseisin was 
a crucially important remedy probably introduced in 1166, though there is no 
direct evidence of the date, which protected a person who had been unjustly 
and without judgment disseised of his free tenement. By the middle of the 
thirteenth century disseisin clearly meant dispossession, and it probably did so 
by the end of the twelfth. Orthodoxy before Milsom was that it had always 
meant this, so that from the start it had been available to the feudal tenant 
who had been thrown off his land, no matter by whom. Milsom, rightly in my 
view, questioned this. Seisin of land at first connoted something very different 
from this. It was a relationship with the feudal lord, with land as an object of 
that relationship. The tenant was put in seisin by the lord, typically kneeling 
before him, doing homage and swearing fealty, or fidelity, to him. Those of us 
who have been admitted to fellowships in Oxford or Cambridge colleges may 
have gone through a very similar ceremony, though I suspect that few would 
have recognised that they were taking seisin of their fellowships, and none 
who was not a lawyer would have had a clue what it meant. Only the 
Governing Body of the college can deprive us of our fellowships. In the same 
way, on Milsom’s analysis, only the feudal lord’s court could disseise the feudal 
tenant. The assize was at the start aimed at the improper undoing of a 
relationship, not the improper ejection from land. 
The question was certainly right, and the hardest thing, as always, was 
to ask the question in the first place. But asking the right question does not 
guarantee getting the right answer, and I think the scholarly consensus now is 
that Milsom’s answer was indeed wrong.26 We cannot be sure, and there is a 
real dearth of direct evidence. Practically all that we can go by is the wording 
of the assize itself, and that is decidedly ambivalent. There is slender evidence 
that disseisin was not necessarily something that could only be done by a 
feudal lord. A writ of Queen Matilda has her indignantly complaining that her 
own tenants had been disseised,27 and we can be fairly sure that they had not 
been disseised by her. It looks as if the word was wide enough to encompass 
the ejection of someone who was properly seised, not simply the improper 
breach of the relationship. Other features of the writ are similarly equivocal. 
Milsom’s interpretation is seductive, but by no means conclusive. Against it, in 
my view, are two things. First are the parallels with Roman law. If novel 
disseisin was concerned with the specific problem of seigneurial abuse, it is 
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perhaps odd that there were marked parallels with a Roman remedy for 
dispossession, the interdict unde vi, especially when we know that Henry II’s 
advisers included men with knowledge of Roman law. More likely, we might 
have thought, the English remedy was from the start envisaged as dealing with 
dispossession, as we know it was by 1200. Secondly, the Pipe Rolls show that 
as early as 1166 an assize was providing a remedy for nuisances, and by the 
time of the book known as Glanvill, written in the late 1180s, the relevant 
assize was explicitly novel disseisin. It is abundantly probable that it was novel 
disseisin that was being referred to in 1166. Now, we know that Roman law 
covered what we would regard as nuisances by its possessory remedies, and it 
is not difficult to treat a nuisance, an interference with the enjoyment of land, 
as a form of dispossession. It is rather harder to see seigneurial abuse as 
encompassing nuisances, though as Milsom himself pointed out nuisances 
would commonly take a form which would typically be committed by lords. 
I suspect we can trace a development in Milsom’s thinking, from his 
introduction to the new edition of Pollock and Maitland in 1968 to his 
developed thesis in the lectures given in 1972 and published as The Legal 
Framework of English Feudalism. It is easy to read the version of 1968 in a 
limited sense, that disseisins were dispossessions committed by lords, whereas 
in the later version we are not really dealing with dispossessions at all, but with 
the failure to observe due process. The former, limited, thesis could well be 
right, but it is the latter one which is really powerful and which I find hard to 
accept. Its implication is genuinely radical, that the assize of novel disseisin 
brought about a massive legal transformation, from a feudal world in which 
the primary focus of the law was the personal relationship between lord and 
tenant, and land was simply the object of that relationship, to a world of 
property law, where the feudal tenant had a property right in land and the lord 
no more than a residual economic right. In other words, novel disseisin 
brought about a law of real property which did not exist in the purely feudal 
world. 
As Milsom himself would have put it, either the fit is perfect or it is 
wrong. I don’t think the fit is perfect, however seductive it is. That said, 
however, if we remove the heresy and take the assize of novel disseisin out of 
the picture, the fundamental thesis of the translation of feudal relationships 
into property rights has a lot of substance. The writ of right patent, in the form 
that probably goes back into the 1150s, does seem to focus on the relationship 
between lord and man. It took the form of an instruction to a feudal lord to do 
the right thing by his alleged tenant in respect of land,28 not just to adjudicate 
on a property claim that was being made. By 1200 it would look like a property 
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claim, and unless we are misled by appearances the major transformation from 
personal relationship to property right does indeed look to have occurred.  
It is easy to see the attraction of attributing such a major shift in thinking 
to the operation of novel disseisin. Something, surely, must have happened to 
break down the feudal framework within which the relationship between lord 
and man was the dominant element and to replace it with a framework best 
described in terms of property rights. 
But there is another way of looking at it. The shift in England’s feudal 
framework is mirrored exactly by what was happening in continental Europe, 
as the feudal relationship, vassalage, was brought within the Roman world of 
ownership and possession of land.29 We cannot be sure exactly when this 
occurred, but it was in the second half of the twelfth century. The first jurist 
unequivocally to analyse in this way was Pilius, commenting on the Milanese 
Libri Feudorum sometime before 1200, but it may well have been the 
Montpellier professor Placentinus in the early 1160s. In some manuscripts of 
his Summa Codicis, though not in all, the possessory interdict unde vi is said to 
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be available to the feudal vassal.30 Now, this was the Roman remedy that has 
been seen as the model on which novel disseisin was structured, so there may 
have been a connection. Moreover, there is a good case for thinking that it was 
Placentinus’s work, or something very like it, that inspired the English assize of 
mort d’ancestor in 1176, which has parallels with the Roman interdict quorum 
bonorum including a curious twist of the pure Roman law which is attributed 
to Placentinus.31 Whether or not Placentinus did have a direct influence in 
England, we know that Vacarius, who was certainly teaching in England, seems 
to have been giving a wider scope to the Roman idea of ownership than was 
warranted by the Roman texts, and the same may have been true of Johannes 
Bassianus who was very probably teaching here around the end of the twelfth 
century.32 
It may well be that the thinking that inspired the legislative introduction 
of the English possessory assizes was Roman, or continental, thinking, and the 
presence of those assizes, quick and cheap remedies, served to accelerate the 
proprietisation of the feudal relationship. 
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There are, I am sure, many other explanations, and the shift was 
probably multi-faceted. As Milsom warned us in the introduction to the 
Historical Foundations of the Common Law, that no single answer is likely to be 
right and any picture is a personal one. 
Trespass, debt and property. Milsom’s legal history was far wider 
ranging than these and we may all have our favourite places where his insights 
ripped open some area of law and brought it into sharp relief. Mine is the 
chapter on the writ of detinue in the Historical Foundations which explains, I 
think wholly satisfyingly, what is going on in the fourteenth and fifteenth 
centuries without fighting shy of the interpretative problems of the cases. But 
that is only one bit among many. I firmly believe that those of us who came to 
legal history after the 1960s cannot with any confidence reconstruct the pre-
Milsom historiography with any confidence, so dependent have we become on 
his way of looking at things and at the professionalisation of legal historical 
study that his work largely precipitated. 
What we have in these situations are very specific pieces of legal history 
based on detailed research into the sources, coupled with the asking of 
different questions of those sources and therefore the generation of different 
answers. Behind this lie some important assumptions about the way in which 
law, especially medieval law, worked. Perhaps the most important of these is 
that the names of the forms of action at first reflect the ordinary meaning of 
words and only later come to take on specific legal meanings.33 Trespass 
originally meant wrong, no more and no less: “Forgive us our trespasses”. Only 
later did it come to refer specifically to direct forcible injuries, perhaps, Milsom 
says, as late as the seventeenth century. In the language of the Middle Ages, to 
speak of a tort of trespass would have been almost laughable. So too with 
covenant. Covenant originally, meant agreement, no more and no less, very 
much the same as our word contract today. Only later did the writ of covenant, 
the form of action, take on its own hue referring to an agreement under seal. 
But we do have to be careful with our assumptions. We cannot really be sure 
what the word disseisin meant in 1166, for example. Another great legal 
historian of the middle and later twentieth century, Brian Simpson, put it 
forward as a general proposition that legal concepts were expressed in words 
originally used in legal contexts with their natural, non-legal, meanings, and I 
believe that this led him into error with his analysis of the early meaning of 
consideration in contract.34 The action of assumpsit was framed as a claim 
based on a breach of promise; but whether promise here connoted the taking 
on of an obligation by the deliberate adoption of a particular social institution 
or only the weakened sense of the word in which we say that all contracts are 
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promises, that we can only guess. It could easily have been both. Did trusts 
originally involve trusting? And so on. Words do not always mean what we 
think they mean, and we need always to be awake to the possibility that they 
are being used in a technical sense which would have been recognised at the 
time, or that a legal concept has developed without an accepted name and 
only later has the particular technical legal name stuck. We have tort cases 
based on negligentia from the fourteenth century, but I doubt there was a 
clear sense that it means the failure to take the care that would have been 
taken by a reasonable man until the eighteenth century at the earliest. 
Nevertheless, so long as we are careful, the Milsomian insight that words 
originally had their normal general meanings is very valuable. I suspect that it 
is something that we all tend to assume in our own work today. 
Another insight which is of general importance is that legal development 
consists in the repeated abuse of basic legal ideas.35 Abuse, not merely use. So 
when we say a trespassory form of action being used for breaches of contracts 
in the fifteenth and early sixteenth centuries we need not assume that it was 
genuinely believed that these cases were seen in what we would call genuinely 
tortious terms. One of the very first of the cases in what we see with hindsight 
as the development of this action of assumpsit as a general contractual 
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remedy, Doige’s Case in 1442, has all the appearance of having been 
conceptualised as a contract case despite being framed in trespass on the case, 
in tort. “It would be marvellous law that a bargain should bind one party, but 
give no remedy against the other.”36 Modern lawyers could learn from this, as 
tortious actions for negligent misstatement first made up for perceived 
shortcomings in the sphere of contractual remedies, then, in a no doubt 
unconscious replication of what happened around 1500, have come to be 
explained them in terms of assumption of responsibility. So when the great 
Harvard legal historian James Barr Ames came to stress the emergence of 
assumpsit in terms of its trespassory surface he may have been guilty of a mis-
analysis of what was in fact going on.  
Related to this is another insight, that legal change commonly comes 
about as a result of lawyers, especially plaintiffs’ lawyers, framing their cases in 
such a way as to maximise the chances of winning in the actual litigation, not 
with a view to developing the law in a particular direction.37 If some way of 
achieving a result works, other lawyers will follow the same route and a new 
rule may in time be seen to have been born. Its history can be reconstructed, 
even if no-one at the time knew that they were creating a new rule. We might 
add that the flexibility in framing cases may equally stand in the way of the law 
                                                          
36
 Sir John Baker, Baker and Milsom, Sources of English Legal History (2
nd
. ed., Oxford, Oxford University Press, 
2010), 434. 
37
 Natural History of the Common Law, 1-23. 
changing. The rule that only the parties to a contract or their privies were 
affected by it could be manipulated as early as 1240 to give rights to a person 
who was not in truth a party to it, increasingly easily after the emergence of 
the Court of Chancery quarter of a millennium later; so easy was it to contract 
round it that the privity of contract rule itself remained in existence for full 
seven hundred and fifty years until it was finally, and then only nearly, 
abolished. 
And so on. We may all have become so used to Milsom’s ways of 
thinking, imbibing them from the Historical Foundations and reading them 
made explicit in the Natural History of the Common Law, that we go along his 
paths almost unthinkingly.  
A lawyer by training, Milsom was the lawyer’s legal historian. His real 
concern was the law itself and its heartland of private law more than public 
law or its institutional framework of courts, legislature and judges, though of 
course he did write on these too. Indeed, his first substantial work, his 
fellowship dissertation at Trinity, was on the history of administrative law. I 
cannot agree that one needs a legal background to be a legal historian, or at 
least this sort of legal historian, but it does require a lawyer’s cast of mind,38 
and Milsom had that mind. 
As the more perceptive critics of the first edition of the Historical 
Foundations of the Common Law noted, the book is in some sense a work of 
imagination. Many law books are, as general principles are identified from the 
mass of case law and statutes. Those of us who are law teachers will be very 
familiar with the “what if” question, as we teach our students to test the 
boundaries of legal ideas and the limits of legal analogies. To pick up on 
Milsom’s parallel with the children’s joining the dots puzzle, we are almost 
always concerned with the space between the dots more than with the dots 
themselves. Most of the time, whether as academics or judges, we are assisted 
by the reported reasoning in previous cases, though there may still be room for 
the really creative imagination to work, as we can see with Peter Birks’ 
Introduction to the Law of Restitution. The lawyer is always concerned with the 
way in which hypothetical cases would be decided, the “what if” questions, 
and Milsom’s legal history is very much concerned with this type of reasoning. 
And it is so much harder to do it for the Middle Ages, or indeed any historical 
period before the appearance of official law reports in 1865, than it is for us 
today. As Milsom himself said, “There is never occasion to write down what 
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everybody knows,”39 so it has to be left to imaginative reconstruction. Perhaps 
not never, but hardly ever. Milsom himself gives credit to Ralph Sutton’s book 
Personal Actions at Common Law, based on a course of lectures at the Inns of 
Court in 1929 designed to help law students understand pre-Judicature Act 
cases. A few years ago one of my research students pointed out the value of 
model answers to questions in bar exams as a way of getting to the dogmatic 
core of legal thinking in the nineteenth century without getting bogged down 
in the uncertainty of case law, and there exists similar very introductory 
teaching material as far back as the middle of the thirteenth century. But even 
this type of work raises interpretative problems, and can all too easily be 
consciously over-simplifying. The legal historian joining his or her dots cannot 
avoid the problem of lack of evidence of something. Did it not happen, or was 
it so routine that it was not worth recording, or was a point so obvious that 
parties to a dispute always compromised? All we can look for as legal 
historians are tiny traces in the sand of things that might have been 
abundantly obvious to contemporaries – or, indeed, might just as easily have 
been unnoticed by them too. 
All this is pure Milsom, and it is eye-opening for all those of us who try to 
get to grips with the realities of legal history. All of it is summed up in his final 
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book, A Natural History of the Common Law, and it and all his publications 
underpinning it are works of real scholarly genius. Even if every point he had 
made about substantive law were dismissed as pure heresy, and of course it 
will not be, his influence on English legal history will have been profound. 
So it is with real diffidence that I end by venturing a couple of qualms about 
Milsom’s jurisprudence. 
The first perhaps proves his point that one’s approach to legal history 
may depend on one’s intellectual upbringing or background. I am, at least in 
part, a Roman lawyer, so it is perhaps inevitable that I will see Roman law 
obtruding into English law more than a non-Roman lawyer would. But I do 
think it cannot be ignored. We must always be careful to be suspicious of too-
glib assertions of influence, but we must also not be too dismissive. This may 
have been especially important in the twelfth century, when we know that 
there were men with training in Roman law around Henry II’s court, and I 
cannot go along with Milsom’s conclusion that the Roman law in Bracton in the 
second quarter of the next century was only skin-deep. It was probably still 
significant in the late thirteenth century, when the son of the glossator 
Accursius, who had himself lectured at Orléans, was among Edward I’s 
advisers; and quite possibly it extended into the fourteenth too, and was 
intermittently relevant later. Nor was it just Roman law that obtruded from 
time to time. Read Plowden’s Commentaries from the late sixteenth century 
and we see Aristotle featuring in legal argument, and there is a fair amount of 
evidence that English lawyers at this time were using continental European law 
lexicons and works of legal dialectic to shape their own ideas. Two centuries 
later, it is abundantly clear that English lawyers were thoroughly well-read in 
the works of northern European natural lawyers, as well as the English 
philosophers Locke and Hobbes. These influences creep into case law, but they 
would have been far more significant in legislation, and they were undoubtedly 
of great importance for the writers of some legal texts from the sixteenth 
century onwards. Milsom, I suspect, underestimates all of this; but I might of 
course be wrong.  
Behind this, or alongside it, there lies a particularly English model of law, 
consisting of rules that should be applied by judges in court. Values or 
preconceptions which might have been fundamental in determining the 
outcome of cases, either by influencing jurors or influencing judges, were not 
in themselves parts of the law but rather features of the application of the law 
to individual disputes. It is the legal model we associate with H.L.A. Hart, an 
attractive model but perhaps a limited one if we are attempting to understand 
the law as a complex institution. It lies behind what Milsom described as the 
premiss to his highly stimulating article, “Law and Fact in Legal 
Development”:40 “Legal development consists in the increasingly detailed 
consideration of facts.” The legal historian may be driven to adopt such a 
model through lack of evidence, or choose to adopt it as a way of giving the 
law a measure of certainty and so making it possible to chart its history. But it 
can lead to a degree of misrepresentation, like the wonderfully memorable 
opening of chapter 14 of the first edition of the Historical Foundations: “The 
miserable history of crime in England can be shortly told. Nothing worthwhile 
was created. There is no achievement to trace.” Slightly muted in the second 
edition, to “There are only administrative achievements to trace”, it downplays 
the changes that did occur. Criminal law may well have a miserable history, but 
there were some worthwhile creations, only not in the model of law that is 
being assumed. 
My second qualm relates to the metaphor of joining the dots, something 
we all do as lawyers, and probably something that common lawyers have 
always done. We do it because we assume that there is a right answer to a 
legal question, even if that answer may be controversial. As academics or 
judges we probably have some abstract framework which enables us to join 
the dots, whether that framework consists of legal or moral principles or both, 
or of social policies. Advocates have the luxury of choosing the framework 
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which best represents their client’s interest, persuading a court that it should 
accept it. Unsatisfactory though it might be for a practising lawyer, the legal 
historian has to accept that there may have been no right answer in a 
controversial case, that the law was simply indeterminate. The resolution of 
these indeterminacies may have been a major motor for legal development. To 
complete the Milsomian metaphor, legal history might look like a complicated 
version of the children’s joining the dots, but it is not that our dots are not 
numbered, they don’t even join. But those of us who come to legal history 
from law, like Milsom, can hardly resist the temptation to produce coherence 
where none might have existed. All we can do is populate our history with 
more dots, as in the three great articles on trespass in 1958, so that there is 
less necessity for imaginative reconstruction. And, where we do not have 
enough dots, we need to make clear to those who may read our work where 
we are making imaginative leaps and where we are on terra firma. 
Milsom, I am sure, recognised all of this, which is why he said that in 
legal history all major conclusions must be provisional, all analyses personal. It 
was why he put so much weight on the role of lawyers trying to win the instant 
case, with never a thought that they might be changing the law. It was why he 
stressed his intellectual formation as a lawyer, though one who was also a 
natural scientist at heart who had reluctantly forsaken his test tubes. Why, like 
Charles Darwin, he was a serial heretic. 
I end where I began, with John Baker’s statement in the obituary in The 
Times, that Toby Milsom was the most distinguished legal historian of the 
twentieth century. He was also the most distinctive. No other legal historian, I 
think, would ever explain a series of cases and then say that what he had said 
was “probably all wrong”.41 But, he continued, his question must have been 
right; it certainly was. Even where we disagree with his reconstructions, which 
we may often do, his way of looking at a subject cannot fail to influence our 
own. His willingness to approach a topic by leaving aside orthodoxies and 
looking at it afresh should be an inspiration to us, though his willingness to 
develop his arguments through exhausting analysis of plea rolls, year books, 
charters and other legal literature can be dispiriting for those who want their 
legal history easy. No-one since Maitland had done so much to put our subject 
on a new footing. We are privileged to be his followers. 
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